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The United States Sentencing Commission: A
Constitutional Delegation of Congressional Power
The proposed federal criminal code revision' would comprehen-
sively recast our national criminal law.' Among various changes in
the federal criminal justice system, the bill contemplates the crea-
tion of the United States Sentencing Commission (U.S.S.C.). The
purpose of the U.S.S.C. would be "to establish sentencing policies
and practices for the federal criminal justice system"'3 and develop
techniques for measuring their effectiveness.'
This note describes how the U.S.S.C. will address the problem of
sentencing disparity, examining its philosophical and theoretical
premises and outlining the suggested organizational structure of the
Commission. The delegation of legislative power problem implicit
in S. 1722 will then be analyzed in light of the Supreme Court's
traditional standards for delegation of congressional power to the
executive and judicial branches. Finally, a suggested revitalized
non-delegation test will be described, and it will be argued that the
proposed delegation of power to the U.S.S.C. is constitutionally
permissible because Congress will have fulfilled its constitutional
I S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Senator Edward Kennedy introduced S. 1722 on
September 7, 1979. 125 CONG. IEc. S12,204 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979). The Senate considered
and passed a predecessor to S. 1722 in the 95th Congress. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
124 CONG. Rac. 749-5862 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978). However, the House version, H.R. 6869,
was blocked within a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee and was never re-
ported to the whole committee. Nat'l L.J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 12, col. 2; Wald, Justice in the
Ninety-Fifth Congress: An Overview, 64 A.B.A.J. 1854, 1859 (Dec. 1978).
The effort to reform the federal criminal code began in 1966 when Congress created the
Nation Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws. This commission isued its
report in 1971; their report has served as the basis for legislative reform efforts culminating
in S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which was defeated, and S. 1437. Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1437 Before the subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8575-76 (1977) (opening state-
ment of Chairman McClellan) [hereinafter cited as Senate U.S.S.C. Hearings].
2 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. El, ch. 58, §§ 991-998, at 294-302 (1979).
3 Id. § 991(b)(1), at 295. Senator Kennedy introducted a second bill to revise the federal
criminalocode. S. 1723, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill would not create the U.S.S.C.;
rather a Committee on Sentencing would be established within the United States Judicial
Conference. S. 1723, tit. III, ch. 43, § 4304, at 157. This committee would possess a power
over sentencing equivalent to the power proposed for the U.S.S.C. The guidelines created
under S. 1723 would be advisory, not mandatory as are those of the U.S.S.C. in S. 1722. Id.
§ 4301, at 156-57. Neither is the congressional direction given the Committee on Sentencing
as detailed as the direction given the U.S.S.C. in S. 1722. Id. § 4302, at 157; S. 1722, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. tit. III, ch. 58, § 994, at 296-99.
Congress currently is considering both bills. In its deliberations, Congress is relying on
bearings conducted on S. 1437/H.R. 6869. No new hearings on the U.S.S.C. are currently
scheduled; therefore this note will utilize the reports from the hearings on S. 1437/H.R. 6869.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit I, ch. 58, § 991(b)(2), at 295.
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function in creating the U.S.S.C. as a reasoned response to the
problems of sentence disparity.
THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
Philosophy of the U.S.S.C.
The proposed U.S.S.C. marks a radical departure from the cur-
rent sentencing mechanism:5 it embodies a belief that the problem
of sentence disparity' cannot be solved through the present open-
ended sentencing structure. Under the existing scheme, Congress
sets the range of penalties for a crime and the judiciary imposes a
specific sentence on a convicted defendant.7 While the theory of
contemporary sentencing structure is that justice requires indivi-
dualized sentences which can be provided only by the judiciary,8 the
premise underlying the proposed code is that Congress must allo-
cate the sentencing function to combine explicit standards and con-
sistent sentences with a reasonable degree of individualization.9 The
basis of this allocation is the codification of four principles of sen-
tencing: retribution, specific deterrence, general deterrence and re-
habilitation.10
To implement this philosophy the U.S.S.C. will have multiple
functions. First, it will be given the responsibility to establish poli-
cies to guide federal judges in imposing sentences. The second
function of the U.S.S.C. will be to promulgate guidelines establish-
' "The concept of a sentencing commission was suggested by the Workshop on Parole and
Sentencing of the Yale Law School." S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 1159
[hereinafter cited as U.S.S.C. REPORT].
6 See notes 26-44 & accompanying text infra.
7 For example, in the federal system, second degree murder is punishable by imprisonment
"for any term of years or for life." 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976). Kidnapping is punishable by life
imprisonment or any term of years. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976). Within the statutory limits
federal judges have wide discretion to impose sentence. See FED. R. CraM. P. 35.
See Zalman, A Commission Model of Sentencing, 53 NoTRE DAME LAw. 266 (1977).
See U.S.S.C. REPoir, supra note 5, at 1159-61.
SD . 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, pt. I, ch. 1, § 101(b), at 12. These four principles
represent the first explicit statement by Congress of the principles American criminal law
seeks to promote "to establish justice in the context of a federal system." U.S.S.C. REPORT,
supra note 5, at 19-20.
1 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, ch. 58, § 991(b)(1), at 295 (1979). The policies and
standards the U.S.S.C. promulgates will have to reflect three basic considerations: (1) pro-
moting the principles of sentencing delineated by Congress; (2) providing certain and fair
sentences to avoid "unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibil-
ity to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors
not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices"; and (3) utilizing
"to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior" as it relates to
the federal criminal justice system. Id.
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ing sentence ranges."2 Finally, the U.S.S.C. will be directed to de-
velop techniques to measure the effectiveness of the Commission's
sentencing, penal and correctional standards. 13
Structure of the U.S.S.C.
The U.S.S.C. will be placed in the judicial branch to symbolize
that sentencing is primarily a judicial function," yet S. 1722 recog-
nizes that the executive branch and Congress also have interests in
sentencing which must be respected. The executive branch must
assure that the criminal laws are faithfully executed" and Congress
must set the broad framework of sentencing." To represent these
three interests the U.S.S.C. will be composed of seven members
serving staggered six-year terms.1" Four members will be appointed
by the President from a list of judges recommended by the United
States Judicial Conference. The remaining three members, includ-
ing the chairman, will be selected by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. 8
As a part of its effort to resolve the problem of sentence disparity,
the proposed revision divides the traditional power over sentencing
between Congress and the U.S.S.C. The bill explicitly acknowledges
Congress' interest in establishing the "broad framework" for sen-
tencing. Congress would still define criminal conduct," establish
classes of offenses 0 and set the upper limit of the punishment range
for each class."' In addition, Congress' interest would be served by
requiring U.S.S.C. guidelines to be reported to the Congress.22 The
12 Id. § 994(b), at 296-97. These ranges will be based upon congressionally determined
classes of offenses but will vary according to subclassses of offenses and categories of defen-
dants defined by the U.S.S.C. Id. tit. I, pt. M, chs. 21-23, §§ 2101-2306, at 157-67; id. tit.
I, ch. 58, § 994(b), at 296-97.
" Id. § 991(b)(2), at 295.
1 U.S.S.C. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 1159.
" Id.
,Id.
S7 . 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. Il, ch. 58, § 992(a), at 295 (1979).
1 Id. Although the recommendation list is submitted by the Judicial Conference, the
President will appoint the U.S.S.C. members. In establishing sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.C.
members will be "exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States"
and therefore will be officers of the United States. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126
(1975). Consequently such an appointment procedure will not violate the appointment clause
of the Constitution. Id. However, while the three members appointed directly by the Presi-
dent will be subject to Senate approval, the four members selected by the President from the
recommendation list of the Judicial Conference will not be subject to Senate confirmation.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. III, ch. 58, § 991(a), at 294 (1979). The constitutional
ramifications of such an appointment procedure are beyond the scope of this note.
' Id. tit. I, pt. 11, chs. 10-18, §§ 1001-1861 at 37-153.
'Id.
• Id. pt. Ell, ch. 22, § 2201, at 163; id. ch. 23, § 2301, at 165.
2 Id. tit. III, ch. 58, § 994(n), at 299. As passed by the Senate, S. 1722 requires only that
1979]
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U.S.S.C., on the other hand, would have the power to establish
subclasses of offenses and categories of defendants within the con-
gressionally-decreed classes," and the U.S.S.C. would set the spe-
cific penalty for each subclass of offense and category of defendant
within the congressionally-decreed punishment range." In estab-
lishing the initial guidelines, the U.S.S.C. would be required to
examine the average sentences currently imposed in comparable
cases and adopt them if they fulfill the sentencing principles of S.
1722.21
THE U.S.S.C. AND THE PROBLEM OF SENTENCE DisPARrry
The sentencing decision is afflicted with many ills which combine
to create sentence disparity." Sentence disparity results when dif-
ferences in sentencing among similar defendants reflect fortuitous
the U.S.S.C. report its guidelines no later than May 1 of each year. The guidelines would
become effective 180 days later. No provision for a congressional veto is contained in the bill.
Id. However, the Senate report claims that this reporting provision gives Congress a veto
power over any U.S.S.C. guidelines. U.S.S.C. REPORT, supra note 5, at 1169. At least one
Senator concurred in this view. Senate U.S.S. C. Hearings, supra note 1, at 8577 (summary
of the provisions of the proposed sentencing system contained in the opening statement of
Sen. McClellan). The constitutional ramifications of congressional review of the U.S.S.C.
guidelines are beyond the scope of this note.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, ch. 58, § 994(c), (d), at 297 (1979).
Id. § 994(b), at 296-97. Judges may impose a sentence which varies from the U.S.S.C.
guidelines by writing an explanatory opinion. Id. tit. I, pt. III, ch. 20, § 2003(c), at 155.
Id. tit. I, ch. 58, § 994(k), at 298. It is anticipated that the U.S.S.C. will form several
subcommittees exercising specific delegated responsibilities to develop its sentencing ranges,
guidelines and policies. The duties of the subcommittees could include: (1) review of the
effectiveness of sentencing policies of the probation and parole system; (2) control of the
application of the sentencing and parole guidelines and policy statements; (3) continued
refinement of guidelines and policy statements; (4) development of and lobbying for legisla-
tive proposals concerning the area of sentencing; (5) development and coordination of re-
search (for example, basic research on sentencing theories or applied research on the effective-
ness of presently implemented sentencing policy); and (6) review of the effectiveness of the
Bureau of Prison's corrections programs in achieving the purposes of prison sentences.
U.S.S.C. REPORT, supra note 5, at 1160.
21 A variety of problems and controversies involving the current sentencing process have
been discussed. Among the relevant commentaries are: M. FRANKUL, CI LnNr, SENTENCES:
LAw WITHOUT ORDER (1973); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); P. O'DoNNELL,
M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AD EFFCmVE SErENCING SYSTEM (1977); A.
PARTRIDGE & W. ELDREDGE, THE SECOND Cmcurr SENTENCING STUDY, A REPORT TO THE JUDGES
OF THE SECOND Cmcurr (1974); A. voN HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICES OF PUNISHMENT
(1976); Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentences: Legal and Policy Considerations,
71 Nw. U.L. REv. 29 (1976); Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law
with Order, 16 AM. CrIM. L. REv. 353, 357-67 (1979); Senate U.S.S.C. Hearings, supra note
1, at 8603 (statement of Prof. Louis B. Schwartz), 8880 (statement of Norman A. Carlson),
9018 (statement of Curtis C. Crawford), 9042 (statement of Alan Dershowitz).
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factors. Two kinds of disparate sentences exist: substantially dif-
ferent sentence lengths may be imposed by different judges on simi-
lar defendants for the same crime, or the same judge may issue
varying sentences for comparable crimes committed by similar de-
fendants.2 Although unequal sentences are appropriate to take ac-
count of mitigating or aggravating circumstances which differen-
tiate the defendant or his conduct from other instances involving
the same or similar offenses, " where there are no relevant differ-
ences between defendants or the circumstances of the crimes in the
same category of offense, varying sentences are unjustified."
The two primary causes of sentence disparity are irrational sen-
tencing principles and judicial discretion in imposing sentence. Cur-
rent federal law lacks any "clearly articulated sentencing philoso-
phy to guide sentencing judges in the choice among the sentences
that may be available."" Lacking guidance as to Congress' prefer-
ence among the various sentencing rationales, the judiciary is bur-
dened with weighing disparate sentencing criteria. With too large a
caseload and lacking experience or training in the logic and theories
of criminal sentencing principles, the individual judge, instead of
society's elected representatives, independently decides the ration-
ale for each sentence imposed. 2
The proposed criminal code attempts to supplant the various
irrational sentencing criteria now prevailing by delineating four sen-
tencing principles which will constitute the basic federal policy in
imposing criminal sanctions,-" and serve as the foundation of the
U.S.S.C. guidelines.3" In turn, the U.S.S.C. guidelines will provide
the judiciary with the necessary justification for the sentences it
imposes.35
Sentence disparity is also a function of judicial discretion. Sen-
" Zalman, supra note 8, at 267-68.
23 Note, Disparity and Discretion in Sentencing: A Proposal for Uniformity, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 323, 325 (1975).
" See U.S.S.C. REPORT, supra note 5, at 890, 1161.
3 Berger, supra note 26, at 32. In the same light, congressional establishment of overlap-
ping statutes prescribing varied penalties for a single act or similar acts is unjustified if there
are no significant differences between the proscribed acts.
1, Hearings on the Sentencing Provisions of H.R. 6869 and S. 1437 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1405 (1978)
(statement of Ronald L. Gainer) [hereinafter cited as House U.S.S.C. Hearings].
32 See id. at 1407-09.
" S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, pt. I, ch. 1, § 101(b), at 12 (1979). Although sentences
may be imposed for purposes of rehabilitation, it is recognized "that imprisonment is gener-
ally not an appropriate means of promoting . . . rehabilitation." Id.
34 Id. tit. I, ch. 58, § 991(b)(1)(A), at 295. The relative weight to be given each objective
is left to the U.S.S.C.
u' Id. § 994(a), at 296.
1979]
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tencing power currently is divided among various agencies and deci-
sionmakers having both legal and factual discretion in deciding the
sentence to impose." Diffusion of sentencing authority intensifies
the effects of judicial discretion at the sentencing stage. Currently,
Congress' role is to define the elements of a crime and set the pun-
ishment for it, 31 while the trial judge is to impose the specific sen-
tence within the congressionally-declared range.3 Congress is not
supposed to delegate to the courts this power to prescribe the pun-
ishment for a criminal offense,39 but because Congress in the past
has failed to fulfill its responsibilities in setting the penalties for
crimes by establishing a rational sentencing scheme, the judiciary
exercises a broad discretion in imposing sentence within the statu-
tory limits."
S. 1722 through the U.S.S.C. attempts to circumscribe, the discre-
tion of the individual judge by clarifying the lines of sentencng
authority. It condenses the criminal code's overlapping crimes into
three distinct classes of crimes: infraction, misdemeanor and fel-
ony, 1 and it sets the upper limit of the general penalty ranges for
each class of crime. 2 The U.S.S.C. would then establish the specific
sentence range for each congressionally-defined class of crime and
create categories of defendants and offenses which will be estab-
lished within the sentence ranges. 3 Congress has limited its delega-
tion, however, by describing factors the U.S.S.C. must consider in
prescribing sentencing criteria."
Zalman, supra note 8, at 269-70.
' United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 345 (1878); Harris v. United States, 190 F.2d 503,
505 (10th Cir. 1951).
11 United States v. Johnson, 507 F.2d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949
(1975); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1972); accord, United States v.
Menichino, 497 F.2d 935, 945 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Wade, 364 F.2d 931, 936 (6th
Cir. 1966); Ellis v. United States, 321 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1963); Harris v. United States,
190 F.2d 503, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1951).
11 United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 495 (1948); United States v. Hairston, 437 F. Supp.
33, 35 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
"* United States v. Johnson, 507 F.2d at 829. See generally United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 446 (1972); United States v. Trigg, 392 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 961 (1968). Despite Congress' questionable practice of granting the judiciary a broad
discretion in imposing sentence, the courts have never been called upon to set the limits
Congress must observe in delegating to the judiciary the power to set the penalty for a
defendant convicted of a crime. See generally United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 495
(1948); United States v. Hairston, 437 F. Supp. 33, 35 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
S 5. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, pt. II, chs. 10-18, §§ 1001-1861, at 37-153 (1979).
42 Id. pt. III, chs. 21-23, §§ 2101-2306, at 157-66.
41 Id. tit. Im, ch. 58, § 994(b)-(d), at 296-97.
" For example, in establishing categories of offenses the U.S.S.C. shall consider, but shall
not limit its consideration to the relevancy of:
(1) the grade of the offense; (2) the circumstances under which the offense was
[Vol. 55:117
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By seeking to limit the sentencing discretion of individual judges
through this delegation of the power to issue guidelines and policies,
Congress would thus authorize the U.S.S.C. to operate in the gray
area between the legislative and judicial spheres. This poses two
novel problems: identifying the appropriate constitutional concepts
to be applied in analyzing the U.S.S.C., and assessing the validity
of the delegation of sentencing power inherent in S. 1722.
DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO THE U.S.S.C.
Judicially Imposed Limits on Delegation of Legislative Power to the
Executive Branch.
Nowhere does the Constitution expressly limit the delegation of
legislative power to the executive or judicial branch." From the
earliest days of the United States, however, Congress has delegated
portions of its authority to other branches of the federal govern-
ment.4 ' Although such delegations usually have been upheld as ways
committed which mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense; (3) the
nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including whether it
involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a number of persons, or a
breach of public trust; (4) the community view of the gravity of the offense; (5)
the public concern generated by the offense; (6) the deterrent effect a particular
sentence may have on the commission of the offense by others; and (7) the
current incidence of the offense in the community and in the nation as a whole.
Id. § 994(c), at 297.
Similarly, in creating categories of defendants the U.S.S.C. shall consider the relevance of
the defendant's:
(1) age; (2) education; (3) vocational skills; (4) mental and emotional condition
to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the
extent that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant; (5) physical condition,
including drug dependence; (6) previous employment; (7) family ties and re-
sponsibilities; (8) community ties; (9) role in the offense; (10) criminal history;
and (11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
Id. § 994(d), at 297.
"See generally U.S. CONST. art. L § 1.
,See generally Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding grant of authority to Secretary
of State to refuse to validate passports of American citizens for travel to specific countries);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (upholding broad powers of allocation of the waters
of the Colorado River and its tributaries delegated to the Secretary of the Interior); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (upholding delegation of power to Secretary of State to issue
passports); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (upholding authority delegated to
the War and Navy Departments or Maritime Commission for administrative determination
of the amount of "excessive profits" realized on war contracts); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1 (1939) (upholding authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture to establish tobacco
prices and designate auction markets where tobacco which moved in interstate or foreign
commerce could be bought and sold); Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)
(upholding § 315(a) of the 1922 Tariff Act delegating to the President the power to increase
or decrease import duties).
1979]
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to effectuate the law, some delegations have been rejected under the
non-delegation doctrine. Since the inception of the New Deal over
forty years ago, the Supreme Court rarely has utilized the doctrine
to invalidate congressional delegations of power." Nevertheless,
while the Supreme Court subsequently has sustained the broadest
delegations, often accepting statutory standards more vague than
those invalidated during the 1930's when the non-delegation doc-
trine was being applied rigorously, 8 the Court has never explicitly
abandoned the doctrine, nor explicitly overruled some of its stricter
applications. While the cases from the 1930's are doubtful prece-
dents for invalidating legislative delegations to the executive
branch, the Court's failure to repudiate them suggests that the non-
delegation doctrine remains available to invalidate extreme delega-
tions of legislative power.'"
In refusing to utilize the non-delegation doctrine to invalidate
congressional acts containing vague or non-existent standards, the
Supreme Court has relied on various verbal formulae to distinguish
when and to what extent delegations are allowed. Initially, the
Court required Congress to provide a "triggering" event, announced
by a presidential proclamation, to make the delegation effective.2
Subsequent formulations evolved to guide and limit the exercise of
delegated power by the executive. Theories ranged from the view
that the delegatee merely filled in the details of the statute," to the
belief that the legislation's "intelligible principle" guided the dele-
gatee's actions." During this evolution the Court routinely came to
accept certain axioms of the non-delegation doctrine. Thus, because
fact-finding aids Congress in setting policy and enacting legislation,
the Court consistently has upheld delegations of fact-finding power
to administrative agencies;53 Congress also has been permitted to
"1 In fact, only on three occasions since 1933 has the Supreme Court overruled legislative
delegations. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding unconstitutional Con-
gress' delegation to private parties of the authority to fix maximum hours and minimum
wages); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating an at-
tempted delegation of power to the President to develop and approve "codes of fair competi-
tion" since the delegation permitted the President to exercise unfettered discretion); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (declaring unconstitutional a more narrow delegation
to the President of the power to prohibit the interstate shipment of oil produced in violation
of state law).
,s See, e.g., cases cited note 46 supra.
See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746-47 (D.D.C. 1971).
See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-07 (1974).
s0 The Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
"1 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
52 Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944).
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delegate broad powers to issue and revoke licenses, 5 set rates," and
promulgate rules-including rules enforced by administrative sanc-
tions.56 Moreover, the scope of a delegation tends to receive a liberal
interpretation to accomplish the statutory purpose. "7 These justifi-
cations were developed by the Court because it felt that the com-
plexity of certain problems left Congress no practical alternative."
Thus the role of the non-delegation doctrine has evolved into one of
establishing limits on congressional delegations."
One example of traditional Supreme Court analysis of congres-
sional delegations to the executive is Lichter v. United States,"
where the court upheld the provisions of the 1942 Renegotiation Act
that authorized the executive branch to recover "excessive profits"
earned by corporations through subcontracts with primary contrac-
tors for products used in the American effort in World War H. These
recoveries were authorized despite a lack of any contractual provi-
sions for defining "excessive profits." 1 The petitioners argued that
the 1942 Renegotiation Act represented an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power to the executive branch because of an ab-
sence of any statutory definition of legislative policy and standards.
They specifically focused on the term "excessive profits." 2 Any de-
termination of excessive profits on contracts prior to April 28, 1942
would have constituted, it was claimed, "an unconstitutional exer-
cise of legislative power by an administrative official instead of a
mere exercise of administrative discretion under valid legislative
authority."" The Supreme Court admitted there was no "express
definition of the term 'excessive profits' "64 so the Court examined
the statute and the actions of the administrative officials for an
implicit definition."
The Court found an adequate definition in certain express provi-
sions of the Act and subsequent amendments of it, and in the ad-
ministrative practices implementing the Act. A partial definition of
,See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
" Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-70 (1968).
" See, e.g., L.P. Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944).
', See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
5 See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
" Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1971).
" 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
, Id. at 746. Furthermore, the Act allowed recovery of "excessive profits" on contracts
entered into prior to the enactment of the Act if the final payment on the contract had not
been made prior to the April 28, 1942 enactment date. Id.
"Id. at 774-75.
' Id. at 775.
, Id. at 776.
" Id. at 776-78.
19791
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"excessive profits" was found in an amendment requiring that con-
tracts entered into after April 28, 1942 contain renegotiation clauses
when the profit exceeded $100,000.6 A second statutory change,
requiring that the administrative officials renegotiating contracts or
determining excessive profits should not allow for excessive salaries
or costs, provided further guidance to the meaning of "excessive
profits."6 At the time Congress amended the Act in 1942, it knew
of a War Department directive establishing certain factors for deter-
mining excessive profits and providing a general definition of the
term." The Court did not claim that this represented a real defimi-
tion of the phrase, but rather accepted it as an expression of congres-
sional satisfaction that current administrative practice was within
"the existing specificity of the Act." 9 This judicial acceptance of an
ambiguous definition as an adequate albeit implicit congressional
standard reflected a need to balance maintenance of the constitu-
tional framework against the need for a Constitution flexible enough
to allow congressional responses to complex and critical problems.
Influenced by the contingencies of World War III," the court empha-
" Id. at 776-77.
'7 Id. This second statutory provision did not define "excessive profits" in terms of exces-
sive salaries or costs or offer a guide as to the meaning of excessive salaries or costs. Id.
" Id. at 777. The definition provided by the War Department directive was: "The term
'excessive profits' means any amount of a contract or subcontract price which is found as a
result of renegotiation to represent excessive profits." Id.
' Id.
70 Id. at 778-80. Nowhere in the opinion did the Court address the question of the result
had not the crisis of the second world war been a factor.
A technique parallel to the one utilized in Lichter was used in Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971), to uphold the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970 as a valid delegation of decisionmaking power. The Act granted broad powers to the
President to stabilize prices, wages, rents and salaries through Presidential orders and admin-
istrative regulations. The union sought an injunction against such an order "freezing" wages
and prices. Id. at 742-43. Judge Leventhal, writing for a three-judge district court, acknowl-
edged "the broad discretion given to the President by the Act." Id. at 745. The court recog-
nized that the purposi of the non-delegation doctrine was to allow congressional delegations
of "legislative authority provided it has exercised 'the essentials of the legislative func-
tion'-of determining the basic legislative policy and formulating a rule of conduct." Id. at
746. In light of the limitations contained in the Act, plus the complexity of the problem of
inflation that Congress sought to resolve, Judge Leventhal held the Act to be valid within
the non-delegation doctrine.
While admitting the ambiguity of certain statutory limitations, the court focused on spe-
cific provisions providing adequate guidance to the President in exercising the delegated
discretion. First, in stabilizing prices and wages the President could not set price and wage
levels below "those prevailing on May 25, 1970." Id. at 747. Second, a 1971 amendment to
the Act further limited the President's discretion, since it precluded "singling out 'a particu-
lar industry or sector of the economy upon which to impose controls'" unless wages or prices
in that industry or sector increased at a disproportionate rate. Id.
The Court discerned a third statutory limitation in that the President's orders regulating
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sized the latter half of the balance and upheld the Act as a proper
delegation of legislative power.
The Supreme Court also has discovered implied limitations to
validate standardless delegations involving constitutional rights. In
Kent v. Dulles" the Secretary of State denied passports to two
applicants because they refused to comply with regulations issued
by the Secretary of State requiring affidavits stating they were not
communists. The regulations were premised upon a standardless
delegation from Congress, 2 directing the Secretary to "issue pass-
ports under such rules as the President shall designate and pro-
scribe.""3 When Congress, in 1952, made possession of a passport
mandatory for foreign travel by an American citizen, the President
or his subordinate had the power to deny a citizen's right to travel.7'
Mr. Justice Douglas, for the Court, narrowed the issue to avoid
any delegation question. This was necessitated by the standardless
delegation that Congress gave the Secretary of State and in light of
the concession by the Solicitor General that the "right to travel is a
part of the 'liberty' of which a citizen cannot be deprived without
due process of law."'7 5 Without such a narrow reading, the Court
would have had to consider whether Congress had delegated to the
Secretary the power to abridge the right to travel. Justice Douglas
avoided this issue by noting that from the codification of the Pass-
port Act in 1926 down to the 1952 Act which made possession of a
passport mandatory for foreign travel, passports had been denied for
only three reasons: lack of citizenship or allegiance to the United
States and criminal conduct." The individuals in Kent had been
denied passports on neither ground, and the Court concluded that
these were "the only ones. . . adopted by Congress in light of prior
administrative practice."" These three bases became the standards
wages and prices were limited to a six-month lifespan with subsequent extensions of these
orders limited to shorter durations. Id. at 754.
A less specific, non-statutory limitation, which also demonstrated the difficulty of combat-
ing "inflationary psychology," was the experience of Congress and the judiciary in resolving
the inflation caused by World War II and the Korean War. Id. at 748-50. Viewed from this
background, the Act provided less discretionary power than the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, id. at 747, which had been validated in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
Despite the absence of a wartime emergency, however, Congress was "entitled to a fresh
approach" in light of the divergent views of the causes of and alternate solutions to inflation.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 748-54.
71 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
71 Id. at 123.
' Id.
74 Id. at 128.
73 Id. at 125.
71 Id. at 127.
" Id. at 128.
1979]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
read into the 1952 Act as a "legislative" limitation on the otherwise
"unbridled discretion," given to the Secretary of State."
These traditional tests for a congressional delegation could be
utilized to formulate adequate limitations upon the delegation of
power to the U.S.S.C. First, it should be recognized that the prob-
lem of disparate sentences is complex and that Congress is entitled
"to a fresh approach" in solving it. 9 Next, the "filling up the de-
tails"80 or the "intelligible principle""' rationales can be utilized to
characterize the U.S.S.C. as the delegatee implementing the con-
gressional decision to establish rational sentencing schemes apply-
ing specific principles. Other aspects of S. 1722 further bolster the
comparison to these traditional approaches. Congress not only has
set the basic sentencing philosophy, but has also created three
classes of crimes (infraction, misdemeanor and felony) 2 for which
three levels of punishment (probation, fines and imprisonment)3
are allowed within maximum levels. 4 Further, Congress sets forth
the factors for defining categories of defendants. 5 Thus the Com-
mission's role would be to apply the general policy and factors of S.
1722 through the sentence ranges to specific subclasses of offenses
and categories of defendants which it will develop. Either justifica-
tion for the delegation to the U.S.S.C. is premised upon acceptance
of Congress' belief that the general problem of sentencing, along
78 Id. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), upheld a similar standardless delegation in the
same area of administration by relying upon a long-standing practice known to Congress when
it enacted the 1952 statute. The State Department prevented the petitioners from traveling
to Cuba by refusing to validate passports for transit there pursuant to a departmental regula-
tion which was premised on the 1926 statute, restricting travel to certain countries (including
Cuba). Violations of these area restrictions resulted in criminal sanctions. The Court upheld
these regulations since Congress, at the time of the 1952 enactment giving the Secretary the
power to grant or deny passport applications, knew of the practice of area restrictions. The
Court rejected the argument that the petitioner's first and fifth amendment rights were
impaired, and similarly rejected the contention that the basic delegation to the Secretary of
State was unconstitutional due to a lack of any standard. Id. at 1-11.
Mr. Justice Black, in a vigorous dissent, attacked the legislation as a standardless delega-
tion of legislative power in violation of the Constitution. The basis of his dissent was the belief
that the challenged regulations represented a delegation of the congressional lawmaking
function and were not a mere bestowal of an executive or law-executing function. The chal-
lenged delegation was even more objectionable in Black's view because a constitutional right
was abridged and a criminal sanction imposed on any citizen exercising that right in violation
of the Secretary's regulations. Id. at 20-23.
1' See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 774-78 (1948); Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 750-54 (D.D.C. 1971).
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
'I Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
82 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, pt. II, chs. 10-18, §§ 1001-1861, at 37-153 (1979).
13 Id. pt. DI, chs. 21-23, §§ 2101-2306, at 157-66.
" Id.
Id. tit. III, ch. 58, § 994(d), at 297.
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with the specific problem of disparate sentences, cannot be dealt
with merely by enacting legislation. The only courses left to Con-
gress are either to outline the area in which its delegatee is to oper-
ate and give it the power to solve the problem, or to pass and con-
stantly amend a series of complex laws to address the problem as it
evolves.
Kent v. DuIles"8 offers an analogous basis on which the delegation
to the U.S.S.C. could be upheld. There the Court relied on agency
procedures known at the time the statute was enacted to limit the
standardless delegation contained in the statute. Similarly, the
U.S.S.C., in promulgating its initial guidelines, is to be guided by
the "average sentences imposed . . prior to the creation of the
Commission."" These average sentences are known to Congress"
just as the reasons for denying passports were known in 1952. Thus,
if the delegation to the U.S.S.C. appears to be too broad, the ration-
ale of Kent would offer the means to limit the U.S.S.C.'s discretion
without invalidating the delegation.
Because the sentencing choices of the U.S.S.C. would be governed
by explicit congressional standards, the delegation of power would
be permissible under the traditional non-delegation tests; but this
would involve reaching the right result for the wrong reasons. Rely-
ing on the traditional tests perpetuates the illogical basis of the non-
delegation doctrine.
Delegation of Non-Judicial Power to the Judiciary
The U.S.S.C. delegation also could be analogized to delegations
of arguably non-judicial power to the judiciary. While Congress has
never attempted to delegate to the judiciary the power to prescribe
the exact punishment for a specific crime, other non-judicial powers
have been delegated successfully, suggesting that Congress may del-
egate some of its penal power to the U.S.S.C.
Congress has delegated to the Supreme Court the power, subject
to congressional review and veto, to establish rules of practice and
procedure for the federal courts." Generally, however, the Supreme
Court's exercise of rulemaking power has not been attended by con-
gressional assertions of the retained legislative power to change rules
U 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
" S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. mI, ch. 58, § 994(k), at 298 (1979).
u Senate U.S.S. C. Hearings, supra note 1, at 9227 (average sentences imposed and served
for federal offenses committed in randomly selected districts).
u 18 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3372 (1976); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1970); 28 U:S.C. § 2076 (1976).
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of procedure and practice prescribed by the Court." Until recently,91
controversial rules had never caused the perimeter of the Court's
rulemaking power to be approached. Constitutional questions con-
cerning the proper division of power between Congress and the Su-
preme Court over judicial practice and procedure have seldom aris-
en and have never been settled.92 As a consequence, the Court domi-
nated the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,93 the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,94 the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 5 and general rules of practice and procedure under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.96 The only restraint on the Court's domination is an
unexercised congressional veto power over the substantive nature of
the rules. 7
Wayman v. Southard,5 the first case to examine judicial rule-
making, held that the 1792 Process Act provision, delegating to the
federal courts power to alter regulations concerning executive proc-
esses issued by the courts, was not an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority. The Court recognized a gray area between
exclusively legislative power and exclusively judicial power, but al-
See 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.501[2], [3], at 5020-35 (2d ed. 1974).
" On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court issued proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 194-353
(1972). On January 29, 1973, Senator Sam Ervin introduced a bill seeking to prevent these
rules from taking effect until the close of the first session of the 93d Congress. 119 CONG. REc.
2395 (1973). The House of Representatives amended the bill to require affirmative congres-
sional approval of the rules. 119 CONG. REc. 7652 (1973). Senator Ervin's bill, as amended,
became law on March 30, 1973. 119 CONG. Rc. 5987 (1973).
92 MOORE, supra note 90, 0.501[2]-[3], at 5020-35. The judiciary has long exercised
statutory power over its own procedure. The 1789 Judiciary Act granted the Supreme Court
the power "'to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting [of] busi-
ness in the said Courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United
States.'" Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). The Court has accepted
Congress' dominant power over federal rules of procedure and practice; apparently the Court
also would accept a clear congressional withdrawal of its rulemaking power. See, e.g., Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3372 (1976).
13 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
Is Id.. § 2075.
See generally Abourezek, Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Bruff & Gellhorn,
Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HAIv.
L. REv. 1369 (1977); Cooper & Cooper, Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH.
L. Rov. 467 (1962); Miller & Knapp, Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional
Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Address by Antonin Scalia, Proceedings of the Adminis-
trative Law Section's 1976 Bicentennial Institute-Oversight and Review of Agency Decision-
making (Mar. 19, 1976), reprinted in 28 An. L. REv. 661, 684-95 (1975); Watson, Congress
Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983 (1975).




lowed Congress to delegate powers shared with the other branches
of government.'0 Despite the language of Wayman which seems to
allow delegated judicial rulemaking, the Court did not adopt proce-
dural rules governing actions at law until the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated in 1938, because Congress failed to
delegate such power to the Court.'' This failure to delegate the
power, considered in combination with Congress' veto power over
procedural rules, suggests that the correct source of the Court's
rulemaking power is not an inherent judicial power, but a delegated
legislative power.
Not until 1940, in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,' were these subtle
distinctions in the possible basis of the Supreme Court's rulemaking
power presented to the Court. The underlying issue in Sibbach was
whether the Court could constitutionally act as Congress' delegatee
in formulating a code of federal rules of procedure."3 The Court
viewed judicial procedure as properly within the legislative realm;
thus Congress could delegate rulemaking power to the judiciary,
provided that the judiciary's rules of procedure would not alter the
substantive rights of a litigant."4 A procedural rule changing sub-
stantive rights would be evidence of the Court's acting in a legisla-
tive, non-judicial sphere.'
The delegation to the U.S.S.C. of the authority to promulgate
sentence guidelines and ranges cannot be justified as merely delega-
tion to the judiciary of the power to administer the business of the
courts, because these guidelines will affect the substantive rights of
the convicted defendants. If the U.S.S.C. guidelines are viewed as
substantive, Wayman and Sibbach might appear to render them
unconstitutional. Dicta in these decisions, however, provide support
by analogy for the delegation to the U.S.S.C. on another point. The
Court in Sibbach recognized a gray area incident to the delegation
' Id. at 43.
" Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
The Supreme Court, however, did issue equity rules in 1822, Rules of Practice for the Courts
of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v (1822), and admiralty rules in 1842, Rules
of Practice of the Courts of the United States in Causes of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdic-
tion, 44 U.S. (3 How.) iii (1845).
1- 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
10 Id. at 9-10.
104 Id.
10 Id. See generally Comment, Rules of Evidence and the Federal Practice: Limits on the
Supreme Court's Rulemaking Power, 1974 ARz. ST. L.J. 77, 78-79 (1974); Weinstein, Reform
of the Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLuM. L. REv. 905, 930 (1976). Further
limitations on judicially developed rules were that they could not be at odds with the laws or




of congressional authority over procedure,'06 within which Congress
could delegate those powers it shared with the other branches' 07 to
promote efficiency in the federal judicial process.' 8 Consequently,
the congressional delegation to the Supreme Court to develop and
enforce rules of procedure, subject only to congressional review and
possible disapproval, was upheld.' 9
A gray area calling for similar treatment exists in relation to
sentencing today, although the matters involved are substantive.
No explicit sentencing philosophy exists; rather each judge follows
his own philosophy every time a sentence is imposed."10 Congress,
through S. 1722 and the U.S.S.C., seeks to clarify the rationale of
sentencing responsibility. First, S. 1722 defines the principles of
sentencing"' which will fulfill the purpose of establishing "justice in
the context of the federal system."" 2 Next, Congress continues to
provide the definition of a crime"' and place it within a general class
of offenses"4 with a corresponding level of penalty"' for which a
maximum punishment limit is set."' While Congress sets the gen-
eral framework for sentencing, it delegates to the U.S.S.C. the tasks
of establishing specific "sentencing policies and practices""' 7 which
fulfill the congressionally determined sentencing principles,""
achieve "certainty and fairness" in sentencing,"' and reflect ad-
vancement in scientific "knowledge of human behavior as it relates
to the criminal justice process.'' ° Furthermore, the U.S.S.C. must
examine the effectiveness of these policies and practices in promot-
ing the principles of sentencing.''
In clarifying the current confusion over the legislative and judicial
roles in sentencing, Congress promotes the efficiency of the federal
justice system. Because the power to set the sentence for a convicted
defendant is a composite of judicial and legislative power, the
106 312 U.S. 1, 8 (1941).
107 Id.
10 Id.
Weinstein, supra note 105, at 905.
,10 See notes 26-44 & accompanying text supra.
"' S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, pt. I, ch. 1, § 101(b)(1)-(4), at 12 (1979).
112 Id. § 101.
113 Id. pt. H, chs. 10-18, §§ 1001-1861, at 37-153.
11 Id. pt. HI, chs. 20-23, §§ 2001-2306, at 157-66.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. tit. H, ch. 58, § 991(b)(1), at 295.
's Id. § 991(b)(1)(A).
11 Id. § 991(b)(1)(B).
120 Id. § 991(b)(1)(C).
121 Id. § 991(b)(2).
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Wayman and Sibbach rationales suggest that Congress may dele-
gate the power to establish sentence guidelines and ranges to the
U.S.S.C.122
Application of Constitutional Supremacy Theory to the U.S.S.C.
Only on three occasions since the Great Depression has the Su-
preme Court utilized the non-delegation doctrine to invalidate dele-
"I Closely analogous to the proposed U.S.S.C. are the institutes and joint councils on
sentencing. 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1976). While this statute refers to "institutes and joint councils"
it fails to distinguish them; however, they are a branch of the United States Judicial Confer-
ence. Id. These institutes formulate advisory sentencing criteria, objectives, policies and
standards for federal judges to consider in determining the sentence for a convicted defen-
dant. Id. See S. ReP. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3891, 3891-94. While this duty relates to the "proposed role in formulating sentencing
policies and guidelines" of the U.S.S.C. it is an insufficient precedent because the sentencing
policies and standards of the institute are merely advisory while the U.S.S.C. guidelines will
be mandatory.
A second statutory body analogous to the U.S.S.C. is the United States Parole Commission
(an agency of the Justice Department). 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976). The U.S.P.C. acts as
Congress' delegatee in the promulgation of parole rules and regulations. 18 U.S.C. § 4203
(1976). While both the U.S.S.C. and U.S.P.C. are subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. III, ch. 58,-§. 994(q), at 299 (1979); 18 U.S.C. § 4218
(1976), and determine the actual degree of punishment, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. IT,
ch. 58, § 994, at 296-99; 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1976), there are several distinctions which can be
drawn between these two bodies. First, in the U.S.P.C. Congress limited the time of eligibility
for release on parole, 18 U.S.C. § 4205, while delegating the parallel power (the determination
of the exact sentence within statutory limits) to the U.S.S.C., S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
tit. III, ch. 58, § 994(b), at 296-97. Second, since the U.S.P.C. is an executive agency, the
present structure of authority over punishment is split among the three branches of govern-
ment. For example, the sentencing judge may impose a sentence of a term greater than one
year which contains "a minimum term at the expiration of which the prisoner shall become
eligible for parole." 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1976). The Parole Commission would then determine
the date of release on parole and the parole conditions. Id. §§ 4203, 4205-4209, 4211. However,
the proposed delegation to the judicial s6ntencing commission concentrates the delegated
sentencing power to set penalties in one branch with a yearly report to Congress providing
the only safeguard. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. III, ch. 58, §§ 991-998, at 296-97.
The U.S.S.C. and U.S.P.C. are also operationally distinguishable. The latter deals with
specific individuals for whom hearings on parole applications must be held by hearing exam-
iners followed by written decisions on the prospective parolee's application within certain
time limits. 18 U.S.C. § 4205-4209 (1976). In so doing the U.S.P.C. must consider the
applicant's history and character in addition to the nature and circumstance of the offense.
Id. The U.S.S.C., on the other hand, will deal only with abstractly defined classes of crimes
and offenders. It will reach defendants only by means of impersonal statistics on crimes used
to verify the effectiveness of various forms of punishment. The judge will continue to be the
official who will deal directly with the defendant. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, ch.
58, §§ 981-998, at 294-302. Congress has recognized this distinction in limiting the U.S.P.C.
to specific channels for securing information related to the parole application, 18 U.S.C. §§
4205-4209 (1976), while allowing the U.S.S.C. to research a broad area to deal with its topic.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, ch. 58, §§ 991-998, at 294-302. Thus the U.S.S.C. would
receive a broader delegation of power than does the U.S.P.C.
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gations of congressional power.'2 This apparent judicial abandon-
ment of the non-delegation principle, allowing Congress to delegate
its power in widely varying degrees, has dissolved the doctrine's
theoretical base. Yet delegation continues to raise significant philo-
sophical and institutional questions. Thus the non-delegation doc-
trine remains relevant for our tripartite form of government. '24 The
most important function of the doctrine is to maintain a balance
between modern society's demands for governmental flexibil-
ity-possible only if broader delegations of legislative power are
allowed-and the constitutional requirement that Congress make
the basic policy decisions embodied in a law.125
This doctrine also maintains the balance between the legislative,
executive and judicial branches. The Framers of the Constitution
sought to remove "certain institutional alternatives from the sphere
of legally uninhibited choices"' 2 to ensure that "the binding charac-
ter of the constitutional arrangement of offices and powers" would
be preserved.'2 Extreme delegations defeat the maintenance of "the
constitutional arrangement of offices and powers,"'1' since such del-
egations are an abdication of Congress' constitutional duty and re-
sult in a new arrangement of offices and powers.129
To avoid "abdication" Congress must make the basic decisions;
when presented with a controversial problem Congress must choose
between the opposing viewpoints.' 0 If Congress deliberately trans-
fers to others the responsibility for such decisions, the delegation
should be unconstitutional. Such a rule does not prevent delegating
subordinate decisionmaking powers, so long as the delegation is a
proper "instrument of decision," rather than a "substitute for deci-
sion."' 31 If Congress makes a clear policy decision among the alter-
natives presented to it, and the delegation involved is able to effec-
tuate that decision, Congress meets its responsibilities.'3 2
123 See note 47 supra.
12' See generally S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL
POWER 14-18, 38-41 (1975); K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 37 (1958); Freedman,
Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 307 (1976); Merrill,
Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB. L. Rxv. 469 (1968);
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
21 See S. BARBER, supra note 124, at 38. See also K. DAviS, supra note 124, at 37; Merrill,
supra note 124, at 477.
12 S. BARBER, supra note 124, at 14.
127 Id.
12 Id. at 17.
I2 Id.
,3* Id. at 38.
222 Id. at 41.
2 Accordingly, the delegation doctrine permits sufficient leeway for administrative action.
In defining a problem and establishing the fundamental policy to solve the problem, Congress
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The traditional non-delegation doctrine does not preserve the nec-
essary balance between the three branches of government. Often
Congress creates an executive agency to solve a problem yet pro-
vides it with no guidance as to the basic policies the agency is to
implement in resolving the problem. Consequently, the agency cre-
ates the "law" and then implements it.'s3
To make the non-delegation doctrine an effective test of modem
legislation,13' the theory of constitutional supremacy suggests a new
two-part approach to the analysis of legislative delegations. First,
the judiciary should place greater emphasis on investigating the
legislative history of a particular delegation to ensure that the chal-
lenged statute expresses Congress' choice among the known alterna-
tives and that it is not an abdication of responsibility.1 35 In analyz-
ing the constitutionality of a delegation the court should consider
the process by which Congress decides to delegate, not the character
of the power delegated nor the identity of the delegatee.1 31 This
should be the focus of the test, because it seeks to preserve the
fundamental functions of each branch of government as established
by the Constitution. Once Congress has fulfilled its fundamental
legislative function the implementation of the law could be accom-
plished by either the judicial or executive branches. Finally, the
requisite explicitness in the statutory standards should be measured
by the complexity of the issues Congress attempted to address by
the delegation. 3 7
sets the permissible limits of the delegatee's action. An administrative agency may then
implement this policy by choosing among different solutions. However, whichever solution is
chosen, it must be within the congressionally-decreed policy and not beyond any limitations
imposed by Congress, or the proposed delegation would be unconstitutional. Id.
3 See, e.g., K. DAvis, supra note 124, at 94-99.
'u While the non-delegation doctrine is unlikely to invalidate most congressional delega-
tions, it still illuminates relevant issues. One such issue is whether the delegation is so
extreme as to alter the constitutional framework of our tripartite form of government. See
generally Amalgamated Meat Cutter' v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). Another
issue is whether any delegated powers to impose sanctions are penal in nature and therefore
an impermissible invasion of the judicial realm of authority. See L.P. Steuart & Bros. v.
Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944).
'" See S. BmARn, supra note 124, at 43-48.
,' Id. at 41, 49.
,3 Id. at 43; Merrill, supra note 124, at 469. The non-delegation doctrine serves other
purposes related to its "balancing" function. The doctrine compels Congress to exercise
greater care in crafting the public policy of the statute. Similarly, where the judiciary requires
congressional standards, Congress is forced to draft statutory language more carefully. Ini-
tially, the doctrine provides guidance to the delegatee administering the law in a degree
varying in direct proportion to the specificity of the legislative standard. In implementing the
congressionally-decreed policy, the delegatee's discretion would be limited to the area defimed
by the Congress, and the delegatee would be forced to determine the existence of any condi-
tion precedent to the utilization of the delegated power. The doctrine also acts to inhibit and,
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The proposed delegation of power in S. 1722 is consonant with the
principles of the constitutional supremacy theory. Congress has not
left to the judiciary the task of selecting the philosophical and insti-
tutional responses to the problem of disparate sentences. Rather,
Congress relies on a commission within the judiciary, instead of on
an executive agency or repeated legislative action, as the proper
institutional approach. Moreover, Congress has weighed the various
potential purposes different sentencing schemes could serve, and
has decided upon basic principles implemented by a general plan.' u
The U.S.S.C. will develop the specific sentencing scheme within the
general scheme Congress has established."9 Congress has further
fulfilled its constitutional role by establishing categories of offen-
ses ' punished within general ranges of fines,' probation' and
imprisonment.4 3 The U.S.S.C.'s role will be to develop specific sen-
tences for specific categories of defendants convicted within classes
of offenses.' This proposed delegation of decisionmaking power
does not represent a substitute for decision; rather the U.S.S.C. will
operate as an instrument of the basic decisions Congress has made
in stating the sentencing policy for the federal system and describ-
ing types of offenses and levels of punishment.
CONCLUSION
Congress has focused on the U.S.S.C. as the solution to the prob-
lem of sentence disparity and proposes to give it authority sufficient
to combat the problem. This grant of power could be upheld under
the traditional non-delegation doctrine or could be sustained by
analogizing it to Congress' delegation to the judiciary of the power
to promulgate procedural rules. This note has argued, however, that
the theory of constitutional supremacy, which provides a basis for
a revitalized non-delegation test, is a more appropriate means of
examining the delegation of power to the U.S.S.C.
The factors, standards, policies and principles Congress has set
forth in S. 1722 reveal that Congress is undertaking a broad consid-
eration of different responses to the problem of sentence disparity.
in some cases, prevent "unwarranted enlargements of legislative grants." Finally, it provides
a minimum yet requisite basis for judicial review of the delegatee's action. Id. at 473-78.
' S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, pt. I, ch. 1, § 101, at 12 (1979).
IN Id. tit. IM, ch. 58, § 994, at 296-99.
"' Id. tit. I, pt. II, chs. 10-18, §§ 1001-1861, at 37-153.
' Id. pt. II, ch. 22, §§ 2201-2204, at 161-63.
4 Id. ch. 21, §§ 2101-2106, at 157-61.
143 Id. ch. 23, §§ 2301-2306, at 163-67.
'" Id. tit. III, ch. 58, § 994(b)-(c), at 296-97.
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The complexity of the problem can be overcome only by an elabo-
rate and specific response premised upon extensive research into the
roots of the problem. Congress has found itself unsuited to the task.
Consequently it had two choices: to rely on extensive and continual
revision of legislation as the problem evolves; or to define the prob-
lem, establish the policy of a general solution and delineate factors
and standards to limit the exercise of the delegated power. In choos-
ing the latter route Congress has fulfilled its constitutional function
by deciding between alternate responses sponsored by competing
interests; Congress has made the law to govern sentencing under the
criminal code revision. In establishing sentence ranges and guide-
lines for specific categories of offenses and offenders, the U.S.S.C.
will be acting as a constitutional delegatee.
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